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Abstract 
 
Gierycz argues provocatively in his paper that the identity of the European Union 
as reflected in its motto, “United in Diversity,” has been “derived” from the 
model offered by the Roman Catholic Church. His argument, however, is flawed 
in a number of key respects. Among other things, he ignores entirely the fact 
that the Catholic Church did not invent the wheel in this respect but modeled 
itself in turn on the earlier example of the Roman Empire. The impression he 
leaves of the ways in which the Church went about imposing its version of “unity 
in diversity” on the local cultures over which it came to exercise dominion, 
moreover, is highly misleading. A third problem is that he treats the terms 
“Catholic Church” and “Christian thought” as if they were interchangeable when 
their references are obviously not necessarily identical. There are also deep 
problems with Gierycz’s attempt to establish that Church–based moral norms are 
superior to those reflected in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
because, as he seeks to convince us, the former are grounded on the “rock” of 
“absolute” values while the latter are built upon the “sand” of shifting 
sociological opinion. These flaws diminish the value of what could have been an 
important contribution to our understanding of the extent to which the European 
Union should look to the experience of the Church in seeking to establish its own 
identity as a supranational institution “united in diversity.” 
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“A Thousand Streams and Groves:” Comments on 
Dr. Gierycz’s Paper “‘United in Diversity’” 
Peter R. Teachout 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Dr. Gierycz argues in this paper that the “identity” of the European Union as 
reflected in its motto, “United in Diversity”, has been “derived from the 
ecclesial [sic] model,” in particular, from the model of the Roman Catholic 
Church.
1 The key feature of the Church’s experience in this respect, 
according to Gierycz, has been its success in finding ways to accommodate 
and embrace local cultural differences while adhering to a core set of shared 
values. Since that is the same challenge now facing the European Union, the 
European Union should be guided by the model offered by the Church. It is not 
just a matter of accidental similarity in organizational structure or experience 
in Gierycz’s view. The very vision of the European Union as a transcendent 
political community united in diversity has been “derived,” he insists, from 
the model offered by the Church.  
This, in turn, has important implications for how the European Union 
approaches the task of finding appropriate accommodation between generally 
shared Community values on the one hand and the particular values reflected 
in the various constitutional cultures of the constituent member states on the 
other. Gierycz offers as an example the tension that exists between the 
relatively liberal values embodied in the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the more conservative Catholic–Church–based values – values such 
as “protection of life from conception until natural death,” “protection of 
marriage perceived as a relationship between man and woman,” and 
“protection of family”
2 – that one finds reflected in Polish constitutional 
culture. In the event of a conflict between these, which of these value 
systems ought to prevail? Gierycz maintains that Poland’s church–based norms 
are superior to those of the European Union because the church–based norms 
 
 
1  Michał Gierycz, “‘United in Diversity’:The Church’s Experience and the European Union’s Identity 
Motto” 2 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2008), at http://www.eurac.edu/edap, 
5. “[T]the EU derives the definition of its identity – whose ultimate expression is the EU motto – 
from European experience, which seems to be comprehensible with reference to the experience of 
the Ecclesia.” Ibid., 6. “[U]nity in diversity is uniquely Catholic.” Ibid., 8. 
2   “The church in Poland has been, in particular, interested in guaranteeing inviolability in the Union 
of basic values that form, as Archbishop Muszynski put it, part and parcel of culture and identity of 
the Polish nation.
1 At stake have been the protection of life from conception until natural death, 
protection of marriage perceived as a relationship between man and woman, and the protection of 
family.” Ibid., 34. Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
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are grounded on the “rock” of absolute values while those embodied in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights rest upon the shifting “sand” of popular 
opinion.
3 Consequently, the “mere Charter of Fundamental Rights” should not 
“be the basis of moral norms” for the European Union
4 since the rights 
embodied there are simply reflections of transient social and political values. 
Indeed, because of this lack of a secure ethical foundation, Gierycz predicts, 
the entire European experiment is probably doomed to failure.
5  
The position Gierycz carves out in this paper is a fairly radical one, almost 
certain to provoke controversy and disagreement. That does not mean that his 
paper serves no valuable function – indeed, the opposite. In the first place, 
putting aside for a moment Gierycz’s more controversial claims, his paper 
does help to correct – or at least to complicate – the view held in some circles 
that “Christian thought and European integration are contained in two totally 
separate spaces.”
6 Gierycz demonstrates here that there is substantial 
overlap between the two spheres. The vision expressed by the motto of the 
European Union, United in Diversity, he shows, has precedential underpinnings 
in the experience of the Roman Catholic Church. Moreover, he offers an 
interesting explanation of how Church values and policies are passed on to 
secular institutions through what he calls “Transmission Channels”
7 which 
allow the religious values and ideas to undergo a kind of secular 
transformation while maintaining their essential character. More generally, 
his paper serves to remind us of the extent to which Christian thought and 
practice underlie and continue to influence the development of European 
civilization. In these several respects, Gierycz’s paper represents a potentially 
important contribution to the existing literature on the unique character of 
the European Union. At the very least, the provocative claims he makes here 
are likely to spark discussion and debate.  
 
The value of Gierycz’s contribution is diminished, however, by a number of 
serious and often puzzling flaws. His argument is open to at least five major 
criticisms. First, in claiming that the Catholic Church provides the original 
model for a European community based on a vision of unity in diversity, 
Gierycz adopts a curiously myopic view of European history. Such a claim 
ignores the fact that the Church was built on the ruins of the Roman Empire 
and that, in establishing and expanding its dominion, the Church adopted key 
 
3   “An important difference between how unity in diversity is perceived from the normative viewpoint 
and in the ecclesial [sic] space lies in the way unity foundations are perceived. … The result of 
replacing a metaphysics of values [the Church’s approach] with a sociology of values [the European 
Union’s approach] resembles, to use a Biblical metaphor, building on sand rather than on rock.” 
Ibid., 24; see also ibid., 22. 
4   Ibid., 41 (quoting Daniel Cohn-Bendit) (emphasis supplied).
  
5   Ibid., 41.
 
6   Ibid., 38 (quoting Joseph H.H. Weiler).
  
7   Ibid., 25-36. Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
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aspects of organizational structure and vision from the earlier Roman model. 
Second, the picture Gierycz paints of the ways in which the Catholic Church 
went about implementing its vision of unity in diversity does not accurately 
reflect the historical reality. It is highly sentimental and misleading. Third, 
throughout the paper, Gierycz consistently convolutes “Christian thought” 
with “Catholic Church doctrine” as if two terms were synonymous, when in 
fact their references are not at all identical. Fourth, Gierycz fails to make 
clear why the values embodied in Catholic Church doctrine should be regarded 
as specially deserving of our reverence or respect. Simply calling them 
“absolute” does not help. Indeed, it underscores the poverty of talking about 
values in the abstract without inquiring into the impact of their application to 
actual human life. Fifth, in dismissing as transient and insubstantial the values 
embodied in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, Gierycz shows 
inadequate appreciation for the importance and staying power of values that 
have been gradually forged over time out of repeated encounters with 
experience. Let us consider each of these criticisms in turn.  
2. The Catholic Church as the Original Model for “United in 
Diversity”? 
Gierycz’s main argument in this paper is that the vision of United in Diversity 
expressed by the motto of the European Union has been derived “from the 
ecclesial [sic] model”
8– by which he means, it becomes clear as he proceeds, 
the model represented by the Roman Catholic Church. The Church and its 
system of beliefs, he claims, provides “the ideological foundation that 
brought the notion of unity in diversity to the heart of European culture.”
9 
The chief problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that the vision 
of a transcendent political or religious community “united in diversity” was 
not original with the Church. As anyone familiar with European history knows, 
the Church, at least in this particular respect, modeled itself on the example 
provided by its predecessor institution: the Roman Empire. When we say that 
the Church was “built upon the ruins of the Roman Empire,” we mean more 
than simply that Christian churches were physically built on the ruins of the 
old Roman temples; we mean that the Roman Catholic Church, in gradually 
expanding its dominion, adopted an approach modeled upon the earlier 
Roman experience.  
Indeed, the Romans were, if anything, much better at it: much more 
tolerant of local diversity, much more successful at finding ways of 
accommodating local differences within a single unifying political community. 
One recalls the famous passage in Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the 
 
 
8   Ibid., 5. 
9   Ibid., 29. Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
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Roman Empire where Gibbon is describing the genius of the Romans, 
particularly under the Antonines, for achieving unity in diversity in the 
cultural and religious spheres through adherence to a policy of moderation 
and tolerance:  
The deities of a thousand groves and a thousand streams possessed, in 
peace, their local and respective influence; nor could the Roman who 
deprecated the wrath of the Tiber deride the Egyptian who presented 
his offering to the beneficent genius of the Nile. The visible powers of 
Nature, the planets, and the elements, were the same throughout the 
universe. The invisible governors of the moral world were inevitably 
cast in a similar mould of fiction and allegory. Every virtue, and even 
vice, acquired its divine representative; every art and profession its 
patron, whose attributes, in the most distant ages and countries, were 
uniformly derived from the character of their votaries. … Such was a 
mild spirit of antiquity, that the nations were less attentive to the 
difference, than to the resemblance of their religious worship.
10  
“The deities of a thousand groves and a thousand streams possessed, in 
peace, their local and respective influence.” This is not a description that 
could be fairly applied to the Europe that existed under the rule of the 
Catholic Church.  
The great achievement of Rome under the Antonines, Gibbon reminds us, 
was that it found a way to harness the energy of the peoples who inhabited 
much of what is now modern Europe in the service of a sense of shared 
purpose while at the same time demonstrating remarkable tolerance for local 
cultural and religious differences. One gets no sense of this, however, from 
Gierycz’s paper. There is no recognition here of how the Church built upon 
the earlier experience of the Roman Empire. Indeed, there is no recognition 
that the Roman Empire ever existed. This is an inexplicable omission. If we 
want to understand where the vision of unity in diversity originated in the 
European experience, and understand accurately the lines of inheritance 
leading down to its adoption by the European Union today, the place to begin 
obviously is not with the Church but with Rome.  
The first major respect in which Gierycz’s paper is defective, then, lies in 
its failure to recognize that, in embracing a vision of unity in diversity, the 
Church was not inventing the wheel but building upon an earlier model 
established by the Roman Empire.  
 
 
10 Edward  Gibbon,  The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. 1 (Modern Library ed., New York, 
1996), 26.  Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
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3. Implementing the Vision of Unity in Diversity: The 
Church’s Approach 
The second major respect in which Gierycz’s paper is open to criticism lies in 
the uncritical – indeed, highly sentimental – picture he paints of the ways in 
which the Catholic Church went about realizing the vision of unity in diversity. 
From Gierycz’s account, one might come away believing that the Church 
succeeded in bringing different subcultures worldwide into a single happy 
family of shared Christian value through the issuance of a few beneficent 
papal edicts. For evidence of the Church’s achievement in this respect 
Gierycz relies primarily on quotations from the homilies of Pope Jean Paul 
II.
11 But that is to ignore the long, dark history of repression pursued by the 
Church as it went about expanding its dominion and imposing upon alien 
cultures the yoke of submission to Church doctrine. Yet there is not the 
slightest acknowledgment here of how, over many centuries, the Church 
stifled dissent (and art and music and imaginative literature) and discouraged 
meaningful expression of freedom of thought and belief.  
Gierycz deals with this complication, to the extent he does so at all, by 
seeking to gloss over it with a veil of euphemism. He tells us at one point, for 
example, that “from its early times, the Church in a sense has ‘affirmed’ 
cultural diversity, forbidding only what has been contrary to its creed.”
12 The 
qualifying phrase offers little reassurance however to anyone familiar with the 
actual history of Church expansion “from its early times.” Beneath that 
seemingly innocuous phrase, “forbidding only what has been contrary to its 
creed,” lies the entire Dark Ages.  
In a similar vein, Gierycz asserts that, in implementing the idea of unity in 
diversity, the Church seeks simply “to bring Christ into life at every level,” 
adding casually (with curious use of the passive voice) that of course “it also 
needs removing from local cultures everything that contradicts the Christian 
message, so that the distinctiveness and integrity of the Christian faith is not 
compromised in any way.”
13 This might seem innocuous enough so long as we 
are content to accept uncritically a benign and generous view of how “the 
Christian message” was extended and enforced throughout Europe. But we 
respond quite differently when we recall the actual history of Church 
expansion – when we recall how “anything” that “contradict[ed]” Church 
doctrine was in fact “removed” from local cultures not just during the early 
years of Church existence,
14 but also later, during the Crusades, and the 
 
 
11   See, e.g., Gierycz, “‘United in Diversity’…”, 30-32.  
12   Ibid., 9 (emphasis supplied). 
13   Ibid., (emphasis supplied). 
14   For a description of the intolerant character of the early Christians, see Chapter 15 of Gibbon, The 
Decline and Fall…, 382-444.  Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
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Catholic re–conquest of Spain and the Spanish Inquisition, and the book 
burning and persecution of those who, like Galileo, argued that the earth 
revolved around the sun.  
One has much the same reaction to Gierycz’s later claim that “respect for 
and affirmation of diverse cultures becomes conditio sine qua non of 
preserving the identity of the whole community,” insisting in the same breath 
that the Gospel “must be assimilated by particular churches without the 
slightest betrayal of its essential truth.”
15 So much for toleration of 
difference.  
The vision expressed in the Gospel is a deeply powerful one. No one would 
argue, moreover, that the Catholic Church employs today the same methods it 
once did in expanding and securing its dominion, in imposing Church doctrine, 
and in stifling dissent. Yet no amount of euphemistic gloss can paint over the 
fact that, for long periods of history, the imposition of Catholic Church 
doctrine caused enormous human suffering. It ushered in the Dark Ages. This 
is not a model, one would think, that the European Union would want to 
emulate.  
Yet, strikingly, one finds no acknowledgment here of the darker sides of 
Church history, no recognition that in expanding its dominion, the Church has 
not always followed the simple example of Christ.  
Failure to recognize and deal with the history of persecution and repression 
pursued by the Church in establishing and extending its dominion – in seeking 
to realize its particular version of unity in diversity – then, is the second major 
failing of Gierycz’s paper.  
4. Convoluting “Christian Thought” with “Catholic Church 
Doctrine”  
Third, throughout the paper, Gierycz consistently convolutes “Christian 
thought” with “Catholic Church doctrine” as if the two terms were 
synonymous.
16 But “Christian thought” and “Catholic Church doctrine” are not 
identical or interchangeable. Indeed, at least since the Reformation, the 
history of Christianity has been in significant part a history of the ways in 
which Christian thought has departed from – indeed, frequently stood in 
condemnation of – key aspects of Catholic Church doctrine.  
This is not just a quibble. It is important because later in his paper Gierycz 
trots out particularly Catholic values – values such as “preservation of life” 
 
 
15   Gierycz, “‘United in Diversity’…”, 10 (emphasis supplied). 
16   See, e.g., ibid., 26-30.  Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
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and “protection of marriage as a union between man and woman” and 
“protection of family” as those terms are understood by Catholic Church 
doctrine
17 – as if they were universally shared among all Christians. But that is 
obviously not the case. Many Christians, perhaps even a majority, do not 
subscribe to the Catholic Church’s restrictive views on abortion or its 
opposition to legislation that seeks to provide for death with dignity. Many 
Christians do not subscribe to the Church’s condemnation of homosexual 
behavior or its opposition to same–sex unions. Many Christians do not 
subscribe to the Church’s hidebound views on the proper composition of a 
family. The fact that such individuals and groups subscribe to views that 
depart from official Catholic Church doctrine in these various respects does 
not make them any less “Christian.” Indeed, if Christ’s example stands for 
dedication to the alleviation of human suffering, it may make them more so.  
Failure to distinguish between “Catholic Church doctrine” on the one hand 
and the many alternative manifestations of “Christian thought” and 
“Christianity” that exist in the world today on the other, then, is a third 
major failing of Gierycz’s paper.  
5. The “Rock” of Church–Based Moral Norms vs. the “Sand” 
of the Moral Foundations of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
In what is perhaps the most controversial section of his paper, Gierycz argues 
that the Church–based norms reflected in the Polish constitution are superior 
to the norms reflected in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and 
thus, in the event of a conflict, the former should prevail. The former norms 
should prevail, in Gierycz’s view, because they are “absolute”
18 while the 
latter are only relative and constantly evolving. Indeed, Gierycz believes the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights is fundamentally flawed: it “falls short of 
forming any coherent system having an absolute nature, but only [has] a 
cultural and historical status.”
19 As a consequence, the “collective identity” 
of the European Union is built “on sand rather than on rock.”
20  Poland is 
justified, therefore, in resisting submission to “a mere Charter of 
Fundamental Rights”
21 since the values expressed there are simply reflections 
 
 
17   Ibid., 34. 
18   According to Gierycz, Church values are “absolute” because they have what he calls “objective 
properties.” They are fixed and permanent, and consequently incapable of compromise or change. 
See, e.g., ibid., 23-24 (contrasting Church values which have an “absolute nature” with the values 
embodied in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights which are “flexible and changeable,” and 
thus “may be redefined in the future”). Cf. ibid., 10 (“[Since] the Church itself is … subordinated to 
these values …. she is not capable of changing in any way”). 
19   Ibid., 23. 
20   Ibid., 24. 
21   Ibid., 41 (quoting Daniel Cohn-Bendit). Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
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of shifting and evolving sociological preferences “established by vote.”
22 As 
such, they can never provide an adequate “basis for moral norms.”
23 Because 
this lack of a secure ethical foundation, Gierycz predicts, the European 
approach to building unity in diversity is “probably doomed to failure.”
24  
In responding to Gierycz’s argument, the place to begin is by asking what 
exactly are these “absolute” moral norms that supposedly lay special claim to 
our reverence and respect? Not surprisingly, they turn out to be the norms 
embodied in traditional Catholic Church doctrine, norms expressed by 
abstract principles such as “protection of life,” “protection of marriage 
between as a union between man and woman,” and “protection of family.”
25  
The problem with claiming special reverential status for these norms is a 
double–one. First, it is unclear why these particular norms have more claim to 
being considered “absolute” than any other. True, they have been 
promulgated and imposed by Church authorities, and, true, they have been 
more or less faithfully adhered to by Catholic believers for a long period of 
time, but that does not explain why they should be considered “absolute” or 
why they should command our special deference and respect. It is difficult to 
see why these particular moral norms by inherent character partake of the 
quality of “absoluteness” more than any other. In any event, at least in this 
paper, Gierycz does not begin to make the case for our regarding them either 
as “absolute” or otherwise as specially deserving of our respect here. 
The second problem is even more fundamental. It lies in the questionable 
wisdom of insisting that at any moral norm in the abstract lays claim to our 
uncritical acceptance without regard to its application in the real world. 
Everyone is in favor of “protection of life” at one level, but what does that 
mean – what should it mean – when applied to the difficult choices faced by 
women (and men) in deciding whether or not to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy? Or when applied to legislation aimed at giving individuals, under 
certain carefully limited conditions, the possibility of ending life without 
unnecessary suffering and with a certain modicum of dignity?
26 I do not mean 
to suggest the answers to these questions are easy ones or self–apparent – 
indeed, they are questions about which intelligent and thoughtful people can 
disagree – but I do want to insist that they are questions. And they cannot be 
 
 
22   Ibid. 
23   Ibid. 
24   Ibid. 
25   Ibid., 34. 
26   For a description of the unnecessary humiliation and pain human beings are forced to suffer when 
denied an opportunity to end life with dignity, see Peter R. Teachout, “A Time to Die: A Proposed 
Constitutional Framework for Dealing with End-of-Life Decisions in a World Transformed by Modern 
Technology”, in Carlo Casonato (ed.), Life, Technology and Law (Cedam, Padova, 2007), 53-64. Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
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answered responsibly without taking into account the application of the moral 
norm to particular situations in actual human beings in the real world.  
The problem posed by Gierycz’s argument here is not unlike that with 
which the English political writer, Edmund Burke, addressed in his Reflections 
on the French Revolutions
27 in seeking to counter what he regarded as the 
uncritical and irresponsible endorsement of the French Revolution by 
otherwise intelligent observers simply because the French Revolution stood 
for “liberty.” Respect for “human liberty,” like respect for “life,” is a 
principle that one would readily embrace in the abstract. Indeed, “liberty” 
like “life” is often classified among the so–called “natural rights.” But, as 
Burke insisted, it is wrongheaded to embrace any moral principle in the 
abstract without inquiring into the conditions of its application in the real 
world – without considering how in actual application it is combined, or not 
combined, with other important values in our lives.  
The passage in which Burke addresses this problem (in the context of 
challenging the wisdom of embracing “liberty” in the abstract) bears quoting 
at length because of its pertinence here. “I flatter myself,” Burke wrote,  
that I love a manly, moral, regulated liberty as well as any … But I 
cannot stand forward and give praise or blame to anything which relates 
to human actions, and human concerns, on a simple view of the object, 
as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude 
of metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances … give in reality to every … 
principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect. The 
circumstances are what render every civil and political [and, we might 
add, religious] scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind. Abstractly 
speaking, government, as well as liberty, is good; yet could I, in 
common sense, ten years ago, have felicitated France on her enjoyment 
of a government … without inquiry what the nature of that government 
was, or how it was administered? Can I now congratulate the same 
nation upon its freedom? Is it because liberty in the abstract may be 
classed amongst the blessings of mankind, that I am seriously to … 
congratulate a highwayman and murder who has broke prison upon the 
recovery of his natural rights? 
 … I should, therefore, suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of 
France until I was informed how it had been combined with government, 
with public force, with the discipline and obedience of armies, with the 
collection of an effective and well–distributed revenue, with morality 
 
 
27   Thomas H.D. Mahoney (ed.), Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (The Liberal 
Arts Press, Inc., New York, 1955). Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
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and religion, … with peace and order, with civil and social manners. All 
these (in their way) are good things, too … 
28 
“I cannot stand forward and give praise or blame to anything which relates 
to human actions, and human concerns, on a simple view of the object, as it 
stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of 
metaphysical abstraction.” That identifies the central problem with Dr. 
Gierycz’s treatment here of norms such as “protection of life” and 
“protection of marriage” and “protection of family”: he invites us to embrace 
these principles in the abstract “stripped of every relation, in all the 
nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction” without inquiring – or 
admitting inquiry – into the conditions and consequences of their application 
to particular circumstances in the real world.  
But before granting to these principles our unqualified endorsement, Burke 
warns us, we need to ask about the circumstances of their application. 
“Circumstances,” as he observes, “give in reality to every … principle its 
distinguishing color and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what 
render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind.” The 
same sorts of questions that Burke asks about applications of the principle of 
liberty in Reflections we need to ask about application of the principles 
Gierycz holds up to us here as embodiments of “absolute” values. Does radical 
opposition to abortion under any circumstances in the name of “protection of 
life” ameliorate or contribute to human suffering in the real world? Does it 
ameliorate or contribute to global poverty? Does radical opposition to end of 
life legislation in the name of “protection of life” ameliorate or contribute to 
human suffering?
29 Does such opposition support or detract from the 
important value we place on human dignity?
30 Does radical opposition to 
same–sex unions in the name of “protection of marriage and family” actually 
strengthen these institutions in the real w o r l d ?  D o e s  i t  s u p p o r t  o r  t e n d  t o  
undermine the important value we also place on respect for the equality and 
dignity of all human beings? I am not suggesting the answers to these 
questions are self–evident, or that there cannot be thoughtful disagreement 
about them, but I am suggesting that to hold up, as Gierycz does here, certain 
abstract principles as “absolute,” and thereby entitled to our unquestioning 
allegiance, without inquiring into their application the real world, is ethically 
irresponsible.  
 
 
 
28   Ibid., 8-9.  
29   See Teachout, “A Time to Die…”. 
30   See ibid. Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
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6. The “Collective Identity” of the European Union is Built Upon 
“Sand”? 
A final criticism of Gierycz’s paper is his too easy dismissal of the norms 
reflected in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights as insubstantial and 
transient. The “collective identity” of the European Union, he insists, is built 
upon “sand” because the norms reflected in the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights are not “absolute” but relative and subject to 
evolutionary development.
31 Because they have been “established by vote,”
32 
they are mere sociological creations. And because of that, he believes, the 
entire European effort to establish and maintain a set of shared moral norms 
is probably doomed to failure.
33  
This argument reflects, it seems to me, a lack of adequate appreciation on 
Gierycz’s part for the importance and staying power of values that have been 
forged gradually out of repeated encounters with real world experience. The 
rights and liberties embodied in the English constitution are examples of such 
rights, yet one would be hard pressed to argue that they are any less durable 
for that. Important American constitutional rights and liberties have been 
established and developed in much the same way. One thinks, for example, of 
freedom of speech and press, and of the right to privacy, and the right to 
equal treatment under the law. Here again, one would be hard pressed to 
claim that these rights and the moral norms they reflect are – simply because 
of the conditions of their derivation – any less worthy of our respect, or any 
less durable, or in any other way less substantial than the moral norms that 
Gierycz holds out to us as “absolute.”  
It is important to remember in this regard that the fundamental principles 
of equality and liberty and due process embodied in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution were initially “established by 
vote.” And the same is true of the norms reflected in the Bill of Rights to the 
American Constitution. Yet, despite having been initially “established by 
vote,” the norms embodied in these documents have shown impressive 
durability and staying power. They have shown a remarkable capacity for 
evolutionary development. In light of that historical experience, it does not 
make much sense to seek to deny the importance and staying power of such 
norms by claiming that, simply because of the circumstances of their 
derivation, they are “built upon sand.”  
 
 
31   Gierycz, “‘United in Diversity’…”, 24. 
32   Ibid., 41. 
33   “[The way adopted by the European Union] to building diversity based on sociologically constructed 
axiological credo is probably doomed to failure.” Ibid., 41. Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
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The fundamental mistake that Gierycz makes is to assume that because 
moral norms have been forged out of experience, and because they retain a 
capacity for evolutionary development, they are any less substantial or 
durable than moral norms that have been established and imposed through 
papal decree. Indeed, it should take no great wisdom to recognize that the 
evolutionary capacity of any system of moral norms is essential to preserving 
its vitality and durability. Edmund Burke describes the great strength of the 
English constitutional system in just such terms:  
Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry 
with the order of the world and with the mode of existence decreed to 
a permanent body composed of transitory parts, wherein, by the 
disposition of a stupendous wisdom, molding together the great 
mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is 
never old or middle–aged or young, but, in a condition of unchangeable 
constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, 
renovation, and progression.
34  
Contrary to what Gierycz argues here, stasis is not a survival trait when it 
comes to systems of moral norms. Any system of moral norms that does not 
retain a capacity for evolutionary development is. 
Failure to appreciate adequately the importance and staying power of 
moral norms that have been gradually forged out of encounters with actual 
human experience, then, is the fifth major defect of Gierycz’s paper.  
7. Conclusion 
 Gierycz does a helpful service here in pointing out the respects in which the 
vision of a European community “united in diversity” has important 
precedential underpinnings in the experience of the Catholic Church. He is 
right, in addition, to call attention more generally to the positive 
contributions Christianity has made to European civilization. He is right in 
insisting that it is impossible to understand European culture or cultures as 
they exist today without reference to those contributions. In the course of his 
argument, he offers an potentially helpful account of how religious ideas and 
values and principles are passed on to secular systems through what he calls 
“transmission channels.” Finally, Gierez is right in insisting that, in certain 
important respects, the Church’s experience offers a model to help guide 
European Union as it seeks to realize the vision expressed by its motto.  
The problem is that Gierycz takes the argument too far and takes it in ways 
that are, or at times seem to be, warped by religious partisanship. The 
 
 
34   Mahoney (ed.), Edmund Burke…, 38. Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
 
influences he is seeking to identify and the moral issues he wants to discuss 
require much more subtle and discriminating treatment than he provides 
here. There is nothing wrong with holding up the experience of the Church as 
a model to which the European Union might refer in seeking to realize the 
vision of a European community “united in diversity,” so long as that is 
qualified by the understanding that the European Union can learn, not only 
from the successes of the Church in this regard, but also from its errors and 
excesses. There is nothing wrong with insisting that Christian norms deserve a 
place at the table in any consideration of norms to be included in the body of 
norms adopted as the moral foundation of the European Union, so long as 
those norms reflect Christian values broadly understood and are not confined 
to the particular norms of a particular Christian church. There is nothing 
wrong with claiming that Christianity has contributed in important and 
positive ways to the development of European civilization so long as that 
insistence does not exclude recognition of the contributions that other 
religions – Judaism and Islam, for example – have made to that development. 
There is nothing wrong with claiming that protection of life and of marriage 
and of the family are, and should be treated as, important values, so long as 
that does not become a justification for seeking to privilege those values over 
other values we hold important. There is nothing wrong, indeed, for asking 
that the particular values embodied in Catholic Church doctrine be accorded 
respect and consideration in any effort to establish a set of shared values for 
the European Union, so long embrace of those values can be shown to 
contribute, in actual application to particular individuals under particular 
circumstances, to the happiness and welfare and sense of worth and dignity of 
those affected.  
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu  17Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Gibbon Edward, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. 1 (Modern 
Library ed., New York, 1994). 
 
Gierycz Michał, “'United in Diversity': The Church’s Experience and the 
European Union’s Identity Motto” 2 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – 
EDAP (2008), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
Mahoney Thomas H. D. (ed.) Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France (The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., New York, 1955) 
 
Teachout Peter R., “A Time to Die: A Proposed Constitutional Framework for 
Dealing with End–of–Life Decisions in a World Transformed by Modern 
Technology,” in Carlos Casonato (ed.) Life, Technology and Law (Wolters 
Kluer, Italy, 2007). 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu  18Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
 
Published in the EDAP series: 
 
02/2008 
Michał Gierycz, “'United in Diversity': The Church’s Experience and the 
European Union’s Identity Motto” 2 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – 
EDAP (2008), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
01/2008 
Dirk J. Brand, “Asymmetry in the Federal System – Constitutional 
Arrangements in South Africa” 1 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – 
EDAP (2008), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
4/2007 
Sara Parolari, “La English Question e il regionalismo inglese” 4  European 
Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2007), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
3/2007 
Alice Engl, “Future Perspectives on Territorial Cooperation in Europe:   
The EC Regulation on a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation   
and the Planned Council of Europe Third Protocol to the Madrid Outline 
Convention concerning Euroregional Co–operation Groupings.” 3  European 
Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2007), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
2/2007 
Dimitry Kochenov,“Commission’s Approach to Minority Protection during the 
Preparation of the EU’s Eastern Enlargement: Is 2 Better than the Promised 
1?”, 2  European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2007), at 
www.eurac.edu/edap. 
1/2007 
Armin von Bogdandy, “Die Europäische Union und das Völkerrecht kultureller 
Vielfalt – Aspekte einer wunderbaren Freundschaft”, 1 European Diversity and 
Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2007), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
5/2006  
Doria Giancarlo, “The Paradox of Federal Bicameralism”, 5 European Diversity 
and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2006), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu  19Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
 
4/2006  
Ringelheim Julie, “Diversity and Equality: An Ambiguous Relationship. 
Reflections on the US Case Law on Affirmative Action in Higher Education”, 
4 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2006), at 
www.eurac.edu/edap.  
3/2006 
Prisching Margareth, “The Headscarf as a Symbol of Non–Integration? 
Integration of Muslims in Austria”, 3 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers 
– EDAP (2006), at www.eurac.edu/edap.  
2/2006 
Palermo Francesco, “Linguistic Diversity within the Integrated Constitutional 
Space”, 2 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2006), at 
www.eurac.edu/edap.  
1/2006 
Blokker Paul, “The Post–enlargement European Order: Europe ‘United in 
Diversity’?”, 1 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2006), at 
www.eurac.edu/edap. 
4/2005 
Marko Joseph, “Post–conflict Reconstruction through State– and Nation–
building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 4 European Diversity and 
Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2005), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
3/2005 
Ferri Delia, “EU Partecipation in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions: Some Constitutional 
Remarks”, 3 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2005), at 
www.eurac.edu/edap. 
2/2005 
De Schutter Olivier and Verstichel Annelies, “The Role of the Union in 
Integrating the Roma: Present and Possible Future”, 2 European Diversity and 
Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2005), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu  20Teachout – A Thousand Streams and Groves
 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu  21
1/2005 
Toggenburg Gabriel N., “Die Sprache und der Binnenmarkt im Europa der EU: 
Eine kleine Beziehungsaufstellung in 10 Punkten“, 1 European Diversity and 
Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2005), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
7/2004 
Marko Joseph, “Five Years of Constitutional Jurisprudence in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: A First Balance”, 7 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – 
EDAP (2004), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
6/2004 
Petričušić Antonija, “Wind of Change: The Croatian Government’s Turn 
towards a Policy of Ethnic Reconciliation”, 6 European Diversity and 
Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2004), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
5/2004 
Henrard Kristin, ”The European Convention of Human Rights and the 
Protection of the Roma as a Controversial Case of Cultural Diversity”, 5 
European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2004), at 
www.eurac.edu/edap.  
4/2004 
Neuwirth Rostam J., “The ‘Cultural Industries’: A Clash of Basic Values? A 
Comparative Study of the EU and the NAFTA in Light of the WTO”, 4 European 
Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2004), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
3/2004 
Herold Anna, “EU Film Policy: between Art and Commerce”, 3 European 
Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2004), at www.eurac.edu/edap.  
2/2004 
Bia Maria Teresa, “Towards an EU Immigration Policy: Between Emerging 
Supranational Principles and National Concerns”, 2 European Diversity and 
Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2004), at www.eurac.edu/edap. 
1/2004 
Toggenburg Gabriel N., “The Debate on European Values and the case of 
cultural diversity”, 1 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP (2004), 
at www.eurac.edu/edap. 